I had always assumed that violence occurs in a state of void where the government has simply failed to provide sufficient control over its population. However, early in the course during Week 7, I read Ana Villarreal’s work on the “defended city” of Monterrey, Mexico, which fundamentally challenged this assumption (Villarreal, 2021). Villarreal describes how the wealthy citizens of Monterrey react to their security being threatened in a world where the state fails to provide full protection for all; instead of suffering, they take it upon themselves to leverage resources to “defend” their city and isolate themselves from such threats (Villarreal, 2021). This realization forced me to reconsider the idea of the "weak state" and recognize that state power is unevenly distributed across different social groups. In this essay, I argue that violence in the Global South is not merely a symptom of state absence, but an active catalyst for unequal state-building. By integrating strain theory and collective efficacy into this framework, we can better understand how different social classes experience and react to violence, ultimately reproducing profound structural inequalities.

     Villarreal also explores the way Colombia's bourgeoisie "disembodied" themselves as social violence in Bogota intensified, and they used private security to make their homes into "armored enclaves" (Villarreal, 2021). We might may further understand this concept when it is compared with the concept of collective efficacy (the capacity of a community to develop shared values and effectively enforce social order). For example, Zhang's research on neighborhood social control in urban China demonstrates how everyday citizens rely on varying levels of local collective efficacy and public police control to manage disorder and maintain safety in the wake of rapid urbanization and the breakdown of traditional social structures (Zhang, Messner, & Zhang, 2017). While marginalized or transitioning communities must struggle to build this collective efficacy from the ground up relying on deep interpersonal trust to protect their neighborhoods from crime elites bypass this arduous process altogether. Because of their wealth, the upper class does not need to rely on neighborhood-level collective action or organic social cohesion; they instead purchase market-based control to construct their defended cities, actively manipulating local state police forces to serve their private enclaves and completely isolating themselves from the violence that plagues the rest of the country.

     For the urban poor, experiences of statelessness are vastly different. The poor are often said to live in “weak states” where formal law and justice are largely absent. In other words, the idea of a "weak state" does not describe the complexity of the issues at hand. In order to create a true understanding of this complexity, it is crucial to add strain theory to the model. Strain theory claims that extreme stressors and strains, such as poverty, discrimination, and state repression can generate an enormous amount of tension and negative feelings in individuals, including anger, frustration and fear. The inability of the state to provide for security or jobs to those who live in the global south is a tremendous structural strain on many marginalized communities. This is demonstrated by Amy Nivette's research on the term "stateless location," which was created using data from Latin America (Nivette, 2016). Because the formal justice systems in these countries are perceived as being either unproductive or corrupt, citizens experience a tremendous strain from their lack of ability to protect themselves from crime and victimization(Nivette, 2016). As a result of having no legitimate avenues for protection, people will often resort to violence (vigilantism) in their attempts to survive.

     The way people get involved in violent political groups is also closely tied to the strain and desperation they feel. For example, Jocelyn Viterna's study of the civil war in El Salvador shows that people don't just join armed groups because they believe in the cause, but because they're responding to really tough situations in their lives. This response is actually quite rational, even if it seems extreme to outsiders. When people are under a lot of strain, they might join a group like this as a way to cope with their circumstances. It's not just about ideology, but about how they're trying to deal with the difficulties they're facing (Viterna, 2006). Viterna identifies the "reluctant guerrillas" individuals who were pushed into the conflict not out of political desire, but out of necessity, coercion, and the need to survive horrific state violence (Viterna, 2006). Indiscriminate state repression acted as the ultimate stressor. Blocked opportunities, displacement into refugee camps, and the immediate threat to their very lives placed incredible strain on these individuals, forcing them to engage in violent collective behavior they otherwise would have avoided because it was their only viable survival strategy.

     When people are left to fend for themselves because the state is not doing its job, something interesting can happen. The shared struggles and hardships can bring people together, creating a sense of unity and collective strength among those who are poor and vulnerable. In these situations, communities might come together to look out for each other, forming their own groups for self-defenese. This can be seen like a rational way for people to protect themselves when the state is not providing adequate protection. However, this kind of collective action is not always stable. The same difficulties and lack of opportunities that bring people together can also cause tension and conflict within these groups, especially when resources are scarce. This can lead to a cycle of violence within the community. Despite this, the emergence of collective efficacy from shared hardship is a complex phenomenon that highlights the resourcefulness and resilience of people in the face of adversity.

     The Global South is often portrayed as a world of crisis-ridden or failed states, but for the elites, this perspective is entirely misleading. While the state might be absent for marginalized populations, it is shaped through ongoing power struggles to serve the interests of the affluent. The work of Diana Rodríguez-Franco on the Colombian civil war provides insights, challenging the assumption that internal conflicts always weakens state (Rodríguez-Franco, 2016). Rodríguez-Franco argues that armed conflict serves as a “taxable moment” that actually strengthens the state (Rodríguez-Franco, 2016). When extreme violence such as guerrilla kidnappings and cartel extortion threatens the capital and lives of economic elites, it imposes an undeniable strain on the upper class. Because they believe the state is capable of protecting their interests, they develop a strong sense of solidarity with the government. We can see how collective efficacy works on a big scale, between the government and the wealthy elite. When they realize they're facing a threat that's too big for them to handle alone, they team up and overcome their differences. In Colombia, this partnership between the elite and the government led to something interesting. The wealthy were willing to pay more taxes on their wealth (Rodríguez-Franco, 2016). Essentially, they were able to use their collective power to influence the government and get what they wanted. This is a great example of how collective efficacy can be used to capture power and shape the direction of a country.

     We can better understand these problems using a theory called Institutional Anomie Theory, which Steven Messner talked about in the context of modern China (Messner, 2022). When a country's market grows really fast, it can create an imbalance where the economy becomes more important than other parts of society, like family, education, and government. In many developing countries, this leads to a situation where the government gets heavily involved in the market to make money (Messner, 2022). This creates a cultural attitude that prioritizes making a lot of money and competing with others over being fair and following the rules (Messner, 2022). As a result, both regular people and government officials feel pressured to engage in corrupt and criminal behavior, which weakens the government's ability to protect the poor and makes the rich even richer. This is a major problem because it creates a system where those in power take advantage of their position to get ahead, while those who are already struggling are left behind.

     When we look at how countries in the Global South develop, we can use ideas like structural strain, collective efficacy, and state-building to get a better understanding. But we need to think about the limitations of this too. One really big problem is that it focuses too much on how well the people in charge work together and collect taxes, which doesn't really tell us if the state is legitimate or not. Justice Tankebe's work on policing in Ghana after colonial rule shows that for people to really respect the government, it's not just about getting things done or being afraid of the authorities (Tankebe, 2009). What matters most is being fair in how the government operates and sharing the same moral values as the public. This is what truly gives the government legitimacy, rather than just being effective or using fear to control people. In many countries in the Global South, the police were originally set up to protect the interests of colonial rulers and control the population, rather than serve the people. This history can make it hard for these countries to build trust and legitimacy in their governments. If a state builds its capacity exclusively by responding to the collective efficacy of the elite, while simultaneously subjecting the poor to immense structural strain and forcing them into vigilantism, it fails to establish universal procedural justice. This leaves an important but unresolved question, Can a state forged through elite solidarity and unequal protection ever be viewed as legitimate by the marginalized majority, or is it doomed to perpetually rely on brute force to police the boundaries between the elite's "defended cities" and the strained, stateless margins?

     The assumption that violence in the Global South is simply the byproduct of a "weak state" is insufficient. By drawing on theories of strain, collective efficacy, and institutional anomie, it becomes clear that violence functions as an active mechanism that reproduces deep social inequalities. The same structural violence and institutional ineffectiveness that impose insurmountable strain on the poor forcing them into reluctant mobilization or precarious grassroots collective efficacy for survival simultaneously catalyzes a powerful, well-funded collective efficacy among the elites and the state. Understanding this dual dynamic is essential for making sense of crime and conflict in the Global South, revealing that the state is not merely failing, but rather selectively succeeding for those who can afford to command it.

Citations

• Messner, S. F. (2022). Marketization and crime in contemporary China: Puzzles for criminological theorizing. Criminology, 60, 223–236

• Nivette, A. E. (2016). Institutional Ineffectiveness, Illegitimacy, and Public Support for Vigilantism in Latin America. Criminology, 54(1)

• Rodríguez-Franco, D. (2016). Internal Wars, Taxation, and State Building. American Sociological Review, 81(1), 190–213

• Tankebe, J. (2009). Public Cooperation with the Police in Ghana: Does Procedural Fairness Matter? Criminology, 47(4), 1265–1293

• Villarreal, A. (2021). Reconceptualizing Urban Violence from the Global South. City & Community, 20(1)

• Viterna, J. S. (2006). Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women’s Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army. American Journal of Sociology, 112(1), 1–45

• Zhang, L., Messner, S. F., & Zhang, S. (2017). Neighborhood Social Control and Perceptions of Crime and Disorder in Contemporary Urban China. Criminology, 55(3), 633-664